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Abstract
Differences in promotion across genders are still prevalent in many occu-
pations. Recent work based on experimental evidence indicates that women
participate less in or exert lower effort during contests. We exploit the
unique features of the promotion system for French academics to look at
women’s attitudes towards competition in an actual labour market. Using
data for academic economists over the period 1991-2008 we find that, con-
ditional on entering the competition, there is no difference in promotions
across the genders, which is difficult to reconcile with either discrimination
or a poorer performance of women in contests. In contrast, women have
a substantially lower probability than men to enter the promotion contest.
Our data does not support that this gap is due to differences in costs or in
preferences concerning department prestige, indicating that women are less
willing than men to take part in contests.
JEL Classification: J7, I23
Key words: gender gaps, promotions, academic labour markets
∗This paper has benefited from the excellent research assistance of Philippe Donnay and
Charles Laitong. We are grateful to Marco Manacorda, Esteban Aucejo, Javier Ortega, Felix
Weinhardt, Stefano Bosi, Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira, Veˆlayoudom Marimoutou, Michel
Mougeot, Boris Racine, as well as participants at seminars at the LSE and Greqam for helpful
suggestions and assistance. This project has been supported by the Agence Nationale de la
Recherche, grant ANR-11-BSH1-0014.
†London School of Economics and Political Science (SERC). Houghton Street,
London WC2A 2AE, United-Kingdom. Email: c.bosquet@lse.ac.uk. Website:
https://sites.google.com/site/clementbosquet/
‡Aix-Marseille University (Aix-Marseille School of Economics), CNRS & EHESS and Sci-
ences Po. Also affiliated to the CEPR. 2 Rue de la Charite´, 13236 Marseille cedex 02, France.
Email: ppcombes@gmail.com. Website: http://www.vcharite.univ-mrs.fr/pp/combes/
§Aix-Marseille University (Aix-Marseille School of Economics), CNRS & EHESS. 2 Rue
de la Charite´, 13236 Marseille cedex 02, France. Email: cecilia.garcia-penalosa@univ-amu.fr.
Website: http://www.vcharite.univ-mrs.fr/PP/penalosa/
1
1 Introduction
Despite the rapid increase in female educational attainment over the last decades,
the labour market outcomes of men and women still differ in terms of wages and
particularly in seniority. The literature on gender wage gaps is vast, but differ-
ences across genders in promotions have received much less attention.1 These
gaps can be large. For example, Bertrand and Hallock (2001) find that women
account for only 2.5 percent of top executives in US firms. Differences in char-
acteristics account for a large proportion of the gap, with the remaining fraction
being usually attributed to preferences or discrimination. A recent literature has
proposed an alternative explanation, namely that women tend to be less likely to
enter competitions and tend to perform worse in competitions than men2. Since
promotions to top jobs tend to be highly competitive, such behaviour could ex-
plain why we observe fewer women in these jobs. Existing evidence is based on
experiments conducted in laboratory conditions, and although the results present
strong support for gender differences in attitudes during and towards contests,
it is not obvious that such attitudes are also prevalent in actual labour markets.
This paper uses the particular features of the French academic system, namely
the fact that promotions occur through national contests, to look at the effect of
gender on attitudes towards competition. In the US and the UK academic sys-
tems or in private sector jobs only information on actual promotions is available,
while the list of applicants tends not to be known.3 In France, academics are
public servants and promotion occurs through a national contest or concours,
with the lists of applicants being publicly available at the time of the concours.
We can hence examine how gender affects both the likelihood that an academic
applies for promotion and the probability of promotion conditional on having
applied. As a result, we can ask whether the lower observed promotion rate of
women is due to lower success in competitions or to their unwillingness to enter
them.
Using data for academics has important advantages. Unlike in many private
sector jobs, where a promotion is associated with longer hours and a requirement
for greater availability outside normal working hours, academics have similar
obligations and constraints at all hierarchical levels. Even if more senior aca-
demics tend to be involved in university administration and outside responsibili-
ties such as participating in committees, seeking funding or performing editorial
activities, these activities are to a large extent voluntary. They are not ‘required’
by the promotion and not performing them would not imply that the individual
is demoted. Female associate professors should thus not feel more constrained
1For an overview of work on gender wage gaps see Blau and Kahn (2000). See Lazear
and Rosen (1990) for a theorical analysis of gender gaps in promotion and Winter-Ebmer and
Zweimuller (1997) and Goldin and Rouse (2000) for empirical evidence.
2See Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003), Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and Gupta,
Poulsen and Villeval (2013)
3An exception is the analysis of auditions for orchestra membership and promotion in Goldin
and Rouse (2000).
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in terms of combining career and family duties by becoming full professors, and
there is hence no obvious reason why they would prefer not to be promoted.
Male and female academics are also likely to have rather homogeneous labour
market attachment, as argued by Kahn (1995), removing one of the reasons of-
ten branded to justify lower promotion rates for females. A further advantage of
these data is that, unlike for most types of jobs, the key consideration in actual
promotion decisions, an individual’s productivity (publications), can be observed
and thus controlled for by the researcher.
In this context, we consider several potential causes of the unexplained com-
ponent of promotions gaps. On the one hand, women may be less likely to
be promoted conditional on having applied, and this could be due either to
discrimination or under-performance during the concours. On the other, fe-
male academics may have a lower propensity to apply for promotion than males,
which could be explained by the requirements of the contest being more costly
for women, to their facing a different tradeoff between salaries and department
prestige, or simply to an unwillingness to enter the contest. The special features
of the French academic system, such as a national salary scale, the need to go
through a national contest in order to be promoted, and the existence of several
categories of academics with different requirements during the contest and upon
promotion, allow us to test for these hypotheses.
We use data for academic economists in France over the period 1991 to 2008,
and find lower promotion rates for women, which are partly but not completely
explained by the age structure and publication records. We then consider sepa-
rately the determinants of the likelihood to enter a promotion concours and the
probability of being promoted conditional on having entered the concours. The
latter is unaffected by gender, thus rejecting the idea that females underperform
in contests, and lending no support to the presence of discrimination against
women. In contrast, being a woman has a substantial negative effect on the
likelihood to enter the concours.
We explore several potential explanations for this difference. We find no ev-
idence that either a different trade-off between income and department prestige
nor the cost undertaking the concours and the mobility implications associated
with it (see below) are the causes of the gender gap. The results seem to indicate
that women are less willing than men to enter competitions for promotion, and
this could be due either to different attitudes towards contests or to the expec-
tation of being discriminated against. When we look at features of each year’s
concours, we find evidence consistent with both aspects.
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we provide evidence
on female attitudes towards competition in an actual labour market and hence
add to the growing body that has addressed this question but which has so
far been based on experimental evidence; see Gneezy et al. (2003), Niederle
and Vesterlund (2007), Niederle and Vesterlund (2011) and Gupta et al. (2013).
Our conclusions are partly supportive of what the experimental literature has
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found. In line with the results in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), Niederle and
Vesterlund (2011) and Gupta et al. (2013) we find that once we control for
observed productivity women are less likely than men to enter the concours
and that this difference does not depend on the visible costs associated with
the contest. In contrast, we find no evidence that women are less likely to be
promoted conditional on being a candidate, which can be interpreted as a lack
of evidence for the under-performance in contests found by Gneezy et al. (2003).
The paper also contributes to the literature using data on academics to try
to understand gender gaps in labour markets, which dates back to the seminal
work of Cole and Cole (1973). Early on, empirical analyses identified both lower
wages and lower promotion rates for female economists; see Johnson and Stafford
(1974) and Farber (1977). More recent work, such as Ginther and Hayes (1999)
and Ginther and Kahn (2004), indicates that in the US salary gaps are explained
by differences in academic rank, while promotions to tenure and to full professor
rank are still affected by gender even after controlling for research output and
demographic characteristics. Some studies claim a decline in the promotion gap
over time, while others find that it is large even in recent decades; see McDowell,
Singell and Ziliak (2001) and Ginther and Kahn (2004). Evidence for the UK
by Blackaby, Booth and Frank (2005) indicates that there are both gaps in
promotions and in within-rank pay across genders, and their findings suggest
that these are partly due to differences in the outside offers received by men and
by women, while Sabatier (2010) documents the existence of a promotion gap in
France.
Most of this literature has considered the US and the UK, which have an
academic labour market with much greater wage and promotion flexibility than
those found in most European countries. Our paper focuses on a different pro-
motion system, and thus we can examine whether promotion gaps also exist in a
labour market that operates in an entirely different way, with salaries being fixed
at the country-wide level and promotions being decided by national committees
and not by the department where the individual is employed.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 starts by examining the possible
reasons why women are less likely to be promoted, we then describe the French
academic system and explain how the different hypotheses can be tested. Sec-
tion 3 describes the data, an exhaustive panel of academic economists in France
over the period 1991 to 2008. Our results are presented in section 4, while
section 5 concludes.
2 Why are there so few female professors?
2.1 Discrimination, differences in payoffs or self-selection?
Although a substantial literature has examined the promotion gap across gen-
ders, a clear explanation is still lacking. Women may be less likely to be pro-
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moted either because they apply for promotion less often than men or because of
a lower probability of being promoted conditional on being a candidate. These
differences may in turn have three possible causes: discrimination, differences in
costs of or rewards from promotion across genders, and different attitudes in and
towards the promotion process itself. Let us consider them in turns.
The first possible explanation is simply that those making the promotion
decisions discriminate against women. This discrimination may be due to tastes
or statistical, and implies that a promotion committee would, for given research
output and performance during the selection process, prefer to promote a man.
Female candidates may also be less likely to succeed if they tend to under-
perform in contests, as shown by Gneezy et al. (2003). As we will see below, the
competitive nature of the promotion process for (most) academic promotions in
France implies that if women ‘hold back’ during competitions they may perform
worse than men and hence will be promoted less often. Both discrimination and
underperformance during the promotion process will result in female candidates
having a lower likelihood of promotion than male candidates.
Alternatively, women may differ in the objective costs of and rewards from
promotion and this can make them less willing to apply, which in turn result in
different observed promotion rates. There can be various causes of differences
in the propensity to seek promotion. First, there may be costs associated with
promotion, and if these are higher for women than for men, they could result in
the former applying for a promotion less often than men. In France, promotions
tend to require moving to a different department and thus tend to imply moving
to a different city (see below for details on the French academic system). If
women’s bargaining power in the household is lower, it may be harder for female
than for male academics to impose the cost of moving on their families. As a
result, the cost of a promotion is probably higher for women and hence they will
be less likely to seek promotion.
Another reason why women may be less likely to apply for promotion is if
the payoff is lower than for men. One possible cause of differences in payoff is
that women may have different preferences over department prestige and income.
Suppose that women have a lower marginal utility of income because, often, they
are the second earner in the household. They may then be willing to be in a
more prestigious department even if it implies lower wages. Since in the US and
UK more prestigious departments also have tougher promotion thresholds (see
McDowell et al. (2001)), this would result in a lower promotion probability for
women.
Lastly, women may choose not to apply for promotion even if we observe
no objective differences in the cost or payoff of promotion. This type of ‘self-
selection’ out of the promotion race can be due to two reasons. On the one hand,
female academics may expect to be discriminated against during the promotion
process. Such a belief will reduce the expected payoff and hence the propensity
to seek promotion. Note that this may happen even in the absence of actual
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discrimination. On the other hand, women may choose not to apply for pro-
motion simply because they are less inclined to compete in tournaments than
men, as indicated by experimental evidence; see Niederle and Vesterlund (2007),
Niederle and Vesterlund (2011) and Gupta et al. (2013) as well as the discussion
in Bertrand (2011). While certain aspects of an academic career, such as obtain-
ing a PhD, depend only on individual performance, promotion typically entails
a competition between various candidates in which only one gets the price. If
women are less inclined to enter competitions, then they will apply less often for
promotion even if costs and benefits are the same.
Existing work has had difficulty in testing these different hypotheses. Part
of the problem is the fact that, in most countries, there exists no record of who
applied for promotion. It is hence impossible to know whether the higher prob-
ability of men to hold a senior position is due to a lower conditional probability
of success of women or to their lower propensity to apply. Moreover, even if
data on applications were available, the tradeoff that exists in the Anglo-Saxon
academic system between prestige of the department and promotion thresholds
makes it difficult to assess the possible causes of a lower application propensity.
In contrast, the French system presents a number of features that will allow us
to evaluate the various options. We next turn to a description of these.
2.2 The French academic system
The French academic system has a number of features that we intend to ex-
ploit to test the above hypotheses. There are two types of academic positions
in France. The most common are university positions, where the individual is
a professor with a substantial teaching load. There exist also a number of pub-
lic research instances, of which the largest is the Cnrs, that have pure research
positions.4 Researchers in this category are hired by the Cnrs, who pay their
salaries, but are attached to a university and are hence located in its economics
department just like the university professors are. Researchers have the possi-
bility to undertake some teaching and they participate in department life in the
same way as standard professors.
For all types of position there is an entry level category equivalent to assistant
professor, termed ‘Rank B’, which includes the maˆıtre de confe´rences positions
at the university and the charge´ de recherche at the Cnrs. The individual can
then be promoted to ‘Rank A’, the equivalent to full professor, a position denoted
directeur de recherche at the Cnrs. Both rank A and rank B positions are tenured,
which implies that an individual who does not get a promotion can spend her/his
entire career in a ‘junior’, i.e. rank B, position. Because of this possibility, we
will term the two types of positions ‘rank A’ and ‘rank B’, rather than junior
4Cnrs stands for Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. There are other instances,
such as the Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, which accounts for about 5% of
the academic economists in France. Unfortunately we have not been able to obtain the list of
candidates for promotion for those and hence will not include them in our analysis.
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and senior. The promotion from rank B to rank A entails a substantial salary
increase and a much steeper slope for salaries over time. The salary scales are
identical for university professors and researchers and set by the Ministry of
Higher Education and Research.5
Promotions take place through a national contest, a concours, and are thus
not decided by the department in which the individual holds her/his current
position.6 Participation in this contest is public information, and at the end of it
a list with the ranking of those that have undertaken it is published. The fact that
departments do not make promotion decisions is important for our purposes. In
a system in which there is a positive correlation between prestige and promotion
threshold, women could choose to select into less prestigious department because
promotion is easier in those, and hence the measured gap would underestimate
the actual promotion gap. A second feature of the French system is that there
is no relationship between department prestige and salaries. Academic salaries
are determined according to a national scale based on rank, and rank is decided
at the national level.7 There is thus no reason to prefer being employed in a
less prestigious department since salaries are the same across universities and
the threshold for promotion is set nationally.
Members of the national committees that decide on promotion are academic
economists, drawn from various universities in the country and areas of expertise.
Committees tend to be large and represent a wide spectrum of universities, not
necessarily the most prestigious. Because members of these committees have to
be of the full professor rank and because of the age distribution of the population
of academics, there is a strong male dominance in these committees. Committees
change regularly, every two to four years depending on the particular instance.
The requirement of the concours differs across the two academic tracks. For
university professors the contest, termed concours d’agregation, is biannual and
entails four stages over, approximately, a 6-month period. It includes a research
seminar, and three oral exams both in the candidate’s field and in economics in
general, one of which consisted of preparing in 24 hours a lecture on a topic ran-
domly drawn by the applicant from a lengthy predetermined list. The concours
hence takes time and requires substantial preparation outside the candidates
field of expertise. In contrast the effort involved in the Cnrs promotion concours
is minimal. The candidate simply declares him/herself a candidate for a position
as directeur de recherche (DR2) and submits a vitae and research proposal to
5Within each broad rank, A and B, there are subranks that affect salary. Subrank promotion
is also decided by a national committee, although the cost here is minimal, with application
for a promotion requiring filling a form and submitting a vitae. Promotion to a higher subrank
does not involve change of department, the number of promotions is not fixed ex ante, and the
list of candidates is not public knowledge.
6Some internal promotions exist for individuals that have undertaken substantial adminis-
trative tasks at the university, but they are rare. See Combes, Linnemer and Visser (2008) for
more details.
7Some departments pay, out of their own funds, an extra salary on top of the one paid by
the university/cnrs. This practice is, however, restricted to only a few members in a handful of
departments.
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the committee. This concours takes place annually.
There is a second difference in terms of the costs involved in the two systems.
For university professors, departments publish before the start of the contest the
positions that they have available. At the end of the concours, the candidates
choose, sequentially and starting with the highest ranked, which university to
join. When promoted, the individual is usually not able to stay in the university
where s/he held a rank B position and has to move to a different department.8
After three years s/he is allowed to move to another university, if the latter
wishes to recruit her/him, including the university where s/he held the rank B
position. For researchers, academics that are promoted can choose to stay at
the university where they are or move to another department. The university
does not need to have an open position for them since the researchers’ salary is
always paid by the Cnrs.
It is obvious that promotion is very costly for university professors. There
is a cost that in principle is gender-neutral, the cost of preparing the various
exams. The agregation also involves a substantial cost ex post both because of
the geographical mobility involved in being promoted to full professor, but also
because the individual faces considerable uncertainty about where s/he will be
eventually recruited if s/he passes the contest since where s/he ends up depends
on her/his ranking and hence on the entire pool of candidates. Since candidates
seeking to become full professor are typically between 30 and 40 years of age, the
process occurs at a moment in the life-cycle when family constraints are likely
to be substantial. If women are less geographically mobile than men, then the
cost is likely to be greater for them.
There are hence two differences between the agregation and the Cnrs con-
cours. First, the former involves substantial costs that do not exist for the later,
notably the fact that successful candidates need to change department. The
second difference is that performance during the contest only matters in the
agregation, as in the Cnrs the committee bases the decision on the vitae without
meeting the candidates.
2.3 Testing the different hypotheses
We can use the features of the French academic system to confront the various
hypotheses about lower promotion rates for women. In order to do so, we will
examine both the determinants of the likelihood to apply for promotion and of
the probability of obtaining a promotion conditional on being a candidate. We
start by considering the gender gap in the probability of success conditional on
being a candidate for promotion, and examine two possible explanations for a
difference across the sexes:
Under-performance in contests: If women tend to perform less well than men
in contests, we expect to find a negative impact of being female on the conditional
8In our sample, 80% of those promoted through the agregation have a new affiliation after
their promotion.
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probability of promotion in the agregation. The absence of a gender gap in this
probability can then be interpreted as no difference in the performance of women
and men under competitive conditions.
Discrimination: Identifying discrimination is difficult. On the one hand, a
negative impact of being female on the conditional probability of promotion can
also be due to the presence of discrimination, and there is no feature of the data
that would allow us to distinguish the effect of underperformance from that of
discrimination. On the other, the absence of a gender effect could be the result
of offsetting forces, with discrimination against women being compensated by
better unobserved characteristics of women (not correlated to observed charac-
teristics). As a result, it is not possible to rule out discrimination even in the
absence of a significant gender effect.
Turning to the probability of being a candidate for promotion, we can test
for two potential explanations for differences at this level by comparing the two
tracks in the French academic system:
Higher cost of promotion: In the US system, it is not clear why women may
have different costs of promotion from men. The nature of academia and the
substantial flexibility associated with this type of jobs implies that jobs at the
junior or senior level are equally likely to be compatible with family life. As
a result, there is no reason why women would prefer not to be promoted. In
contrast, in the French system, the mobility required if promoted (of professors
but not researchers) implies that there is a very specific cost: the need to move
to another university and hence, in most cases, to another city. It is possible that
this cost is, on average, higher for women than for men, implying that the latter
are less likely to apply for promotion. To test this hypothesis we can exploit the
difference between the implications of promotion for standard professors and for
researchers. If women were not trying to get promoted because of the cost of
mobility, we would expect to find a more negative effect of being female on the
probability of applying for promotion for professors than for researchers.
Differences in preferences about prestige and salary : We can also exploit
the difference between promotion implications for professors and researchers to
test the hypothesis of different preferences over salary and prestige across gen-
ders. Since for university professors being promoted to a senior position requires
changing department, promotion brings a higher salary at the risk of having to
move to a less good department. If women are less willing to trade-off prestige
for income, then those who hold a junior position in a top department may not
want to apply for promotion. In contrast, for junior researchers promotion does
not require a change of department, and there is no reason for women not to
seek promotion even if they are in a top department. If women have a stronger
preference for department prestige and/or a lower one for income, those with a
university position will be less willing to apply for promotion if they are in a top
department than if they are not. Because promotion does not require chang-
ing department for researchers, we would expect to find no differences in the
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probability of applying for promotion for female researchers across departments.
Alternatively, the impact of gender on the probability of promotion may be
common across the two tracks, implying that the differences in the propensity to
seek promotion are due to either beliefs or attitudes towards contests. Testing
for these effects is difficult. However, the conditions under which the aggregation
takes place can provide proxies for both a measure of expected discrimination
and the competitive environment. We consider these in turns.
Expected discrimination: To examine whether women’s belief that they will
be discriminated against affects their propensity to seek promotion, we proxy
expected discrimination by the fraction of rank A professors that are women in
a particular year, as a greater fraction could be interpreted by candidates as
weaker discrimination. A positive effect of this variable interacted with being
female would indicate that women’s decision to seek promotion responds to the
observed promotion rate of women in the past.
Unwillingness to participate in contests: Women may also have different at-
titudes from men concerning contests, and, in particular, be unwilling to take
part in them. If this is the case, they are likely not to respond to changes in the
payoff from being a candidate. We hence consider the effect of changes in the
likelihood of promotion, which we measure by the number of available positions
of rank A in a particular year. A greater number of positions should increase a
potential candidate’s expected payoff and hence make him/her more likely to en-
ter the competition. A positive coefficient on this variable hence indicates that
candidates respond to this ‘objective’ measure of the likelihood of promotion,
while no effect implies that individuals’ decision to be a candidate is determined
by considerations other than the probability of promotion, which in the case of
women could be an unwillingness to enter competitions.9
2.4 Empirical specification
In line with the existing literature, we suppose that the probability of individual
i being rank R at year t is given by
Pr(R, i, t) = Φ
(
X ′itβj
)
(1)
where the two states R are being rank A or not, the subscript j = u, r denotes
whether we are looking at data for university professors or researchers, and Φ (.)
denotes the logistic density function. The term X ′itβ in equation (1) is
X ′itβj = βj0 + β
f
j0 δi + βj1 Ageit + βj2 Age
2
it + βj3 Pubit
9A question that we have not addressed is whether the degree of competition is greater for
university professors or for researchers. On the one hand, a much smaller number of researchers
are promoted each year in the Cnrs than in the concours d’agregation. On the other, although
the list of candidates and rankings are available on internet for both, the agregation solicits
much greater interest from the academic community, with results at each stage being widely
followed and discussed, which increases the preasure on candidates. It is hence difficult to argue
that one or the other contest is more competitive.
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+βj4 Pubit ×Quantity it + βj5 Pubit ×Quality it (2)
implying that the probability of promotion is a function of age Ageit and its
square, whether or not the individual has published in Econlit-classed journals
(i.e. whether s/he is a ‘publisher’ measured by the dummy Pubit), the number
of publications and the average quality of these publications, denoted respec-
tively Quantity it and Quality it, both measured in logs (see below for the exact
measurement). The variable δi is a dummy taking the value 1 for females, so
that βf0 measures the differences in promotion probability for men and women
with the same characteristics. We would have liked to control for characteristics
of the individual’s family life, such as whether s/he is married and the number
and ages of children, but such data were not available.10
The probability of holding a rank A position is obviously a combination of
the probability of applying for promotion and that of obtaining a promotion
conditional on having applied. We hence model separately the two process.
Consider first the probability that individual i applies for promotion (i.e. takes
the concours) at time t, which we assume to be
Pr(C, i, t) = Φ
(
X ′itγj
)
(3)
where the two states C are being a candidate for promotion or not and
X ′itγj = γj0 + γ
f
j0 δi + γj1 Ageit + γj2 Age
2
it + γj3 Pubit
+γj4 Pubit ×Quantity it + γj5 Pubit ×Quality it (4)
+γj6 Deptit
The dummy Deptit has a value of 1 if the candidate is in a top department (see
below for the definition) and will capture whether individuals in top departments
are less likely to apply for promotion because of the mobility costs involved.
Lastly, the probability of success in a concours conditional on being a candi-
date is given by
Pr(S, i, t|Cit = 1) = Φ
(
X ′itαj
)
(5)
where the two states S are succeeding or failing in the concours (i.e. being
promoted or not), Cit is a dummy that takes the value one if the individual
applied for promotion, and
X ′itαj = αj0 + α
f
j0 δi + αj1 Ageit + αj2 Age
2
it + αj3 Pubit
+αj4 Pubit ×Quantity it + αj5 Pubit ×Quality it (6)
10In the light of existing evidence, this is likely not to be a major omission; for example,
Ginther and Kahn (2004) find that having children has only a weak effect of the promotion
probabilities of female economists in the US and none on their productivity.
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+αj6 Deptit
Obviously, the qualities that lead to promotion conditional on applying are also
those that make a potential candidate apply, hence it is not possible to run a
selection model.
Equations (1) and (2) capture the mechanism usually examined in the liter-
ature on academic promotions. Assuming that the estimated coefficient β̂fj0 is
different from zero, we can then estimate the two other models to see to what
extent the difference in the probability of being rank A is due to women being
less likely to enter the concours or to them having a lower success rate in the
concours than men. That is, we will compare estimates of γfj0 and α
f
j0.
3 The Data
Our sample consists of the entire population of French academic economists
provided by the French Ministry of Higher Education and Research and the Cnrs
for the years 1991 to 2008. For each individual we have information on age, rank,
publication stock (see below) and department. We keep only individuals that
are in departments larger than 4 full-time equivalent academics, which removes
economists that are isolated in universities without real economics departments.
Those (few) individuals for whom some of the individual characteristics (age or
position for instance) are missing are also excluded.
In order to examine separately the determinants of the probability of applying
for promotion and the likelihood to succeed in the concours, we use the list
of candidates that applied to and those who succeeded in becoming a rank A
university professor or a rank A Cnrs researcher (DR2). For professors we have
the lists of candidates to promotion and actual promotions for the nine biannual
concours taking place from 1992 to 2008, while for researchers we have the six
annual concours between 2003 and 2008.
We define as potential candidates for promotion all academic economists of
rank B the year prior to the concours. It is important to note that it is possible
for Cnrs researchers to take the agregation, and some individuals in our dataset
do so. In contrast, although it is in principle possible for rank B university
professors to apply for a rank A Cnrs position, there are in our data no such
individuals. This is probably due to the fact that few promotions are available
each year (between 2 and 4) and they are perceived as being internal promotions
for those already in the Cnrs. We hence consider as potential candidates for
the agregation all academic economists in France of rank B, which yields 10,383
observations, while we have 681 observations for candidates susceptible to apply
for Cnrs promotions.11
11The difference in the number of observations is mainly due to the fact that the Cnrs acounts
for a small fraction of academics. We have, on average, 114 rank B researchers each year and
1,040 rank B university professors. Hence, there are each year 114 potential candidates for
promotion at the Cnrs and 1,154 potential candidates to promotion through the agregation,
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We define two categories of department, somewhat equivalent to the division
in the US between the top-50 and other departments. France has a substantial
number of national academic publications in French, and hence we define presti-
gious departments as those that have the largest research output in international
journals (see Appendix A for details). For this reason, we will term them ‘in-
ternational’ departments and the rest ‘national’ departments. The international
departments account for about one third of the population each year.
3.1 Measuring research output
Our key explanatory variable is an individual’s research output, and we measure
the output of individual i at date t by her/his cumulative publication record be-
tween the first year for which we have an observation for that individual and date
t.12 We merge the data on publications with the list of French academics that
includes individual characteristics (position, department, age, gender), merging
by surname and initial, and then correct manually for those individuals having
the same name and initial. Publication records are measured as weighted sums
of publications. All publications come from the EconLit database, which in-
cludes more than 560,000 papers published in more than 1200 journals between
1969 and 2008. Three dimensions enter the weighted scheme of publications: the
quality of journals, the number of authors and the relative number of pages.
We measure the quality of publications using the journals weighting scheme
proposed by Combes and Linnemer (2010). Two different degrees of convexity
in the distribution of journals’ weights have been proposed by Combes and Lin-
nemer, and we use the most convex one (i.e. the one that most values quality),
but our results are unchanged when we use the least convex one. We also con-
sider the number of authors of each publication, and assume constant returns
to scale at the coauthor level, so that we divide each publication by the number
of authors, a standard practice in the literature. Lastly, since many journals
now publish both notes and longer papers, we weight by the number of pages
to capture the idea that longer articles contain more ideas. We consider an ar-
ticle’s length relative to the average length in that journal, so that the ratio of
the number of pages of article a over the average number of pages of articles
published in the journal is used as weight. Because editors’ policies can vary
over time, the mean number of pages is calculated for each year separately.
The output of a researcher i at date t is then a weighted sum of her/his
articles a published between the first year in which s/he published an article, t0,
and date t, implying that
yit =
∑
a∈[t0,t]
W (a)
n(a)
p(a)
p¯
(7)
which include both rank B professors and rank B researchers.
12As an alternative, we have computed degressive publication scores, with older publications
having a smaller weight than recent ones. Measuring research output this way does not change
our results.
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where p(a) is the number of pages of article a, p¯ is the annual average number
of pages of articles in the journal, n(a) the number of authors of the article, and
W (a) the weighting scheme for journals. Then, each individual receives three
scores: a dummy equal to 1 if s/he has at least on publication in an EconLit-
listed journal, the quantity of single-author-equivalent published articles, and
the average quality of her/his articles, defined as yit divided by quantity, i.e.∑
a∈[t0,t] 1/n(a).
3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 1: Percentage rank A by gender in 2008
rank A Total % Women % Men %
Total sample
0 1425 67.7 512 83.0 913 61.4
1 680 32.3 105 17.0 575 38.6
University professors (91% of population in 2008)
0 1321 69.0 477 83.5 844 62.8
1 593 31.0 94 16.5 499 37.2
Cnrs Researchers (9% of population in 2008)
0 104 54.5 35 76.1 69 47.6
1 87 45.5 11 23.9 76 52.4
Table 1 gives the decomposition of our sample in terms of institutional affilia-
tion and rank for the most recent year in our data, 2008. There were 2,105 (Cnrs
and university) academic economists in France that year, and the vast majority
of the population consists of university professors, with researchers accounting
for only 9% of the total. Women account for 29% of observations, and they are
over-represented amongst university professors and under-represented amongst
researchers, where they account for only 24% of the population. This difference
could be due to the fact that obtaining a position as a researcher tends to require
a stronger publication record than for university positions and, as we will see
below, women tend to have a weaker research output than men.
Slightly under a third of the population hold a rank A position, with the
fraction being lower for university professors (31%) and higher for researchers
(45.5%). Note that the data do not seem to indicate that women choose a career
path that offers higher average promotion rates, which would counterbalance neg-
ative discrimination. Our data shows that feminisation is lower for researchers,
which have a higher promotion rate, indicating that there is no selection of this
type taking place. The gender promotion gap is large, 22 percentage points on
average, and is smaller for university professors than for researchers (21 and 29
points, respectively).
Table 2 reports some descriptive statistics for the sample of potential candi-
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of potential candidates
Univ’, panel 1992-2008 Cnrs, panel 2003-2008
Min. Max. Mean Std. err. Min. Max. Mean St. err.
Women
Prob. Candidate 0 1 0.062 0.241 0 1 0.103 0.305
Prob. Promotion 0 1 0.020 0.140 0 1 0.018 0.133
Age 27 68 41.6 8.9 29 64 42.8 9.1
Publisher 0 1 0.55 0.50 0 1 0.83 0.37
Quantity 0 15.0 1.02 1.55 0 15.0 3.14 3.22
Quality 0 62.5 0.42 2.83 0 16.6 1.01 2.31
Prob. Int. Dept. 0 1 0.32 0.47 0 1 0.58 0.49
Men
Prob. Candidate 0 1 0.084 0.277 0 1 0.186 0.389
Prob. Promotion 0 1 0.033 0.179 0 1 0.044 0.205
Age 25 70 45.2 9.4 28 65 43.5 10.0
Publisher 0 1 0.57 0.50 0 1 0.91 0.29
Quantity 0 21.2 1.33 2.05 0 16.6 3.70 3.03
Quality 0 116.8 0.46 3.18 0 86.5 2.42 6.27
Prob. Int. Dept. 0 1 0.28 0.45 0 1 0.58 0.49
Int. Dept. = international department; see Appendix A for details. Productivity measures
(quantity and quality) are in levels. We take their logs in the regression analysis. There are
10,383 observations from 2,136 individuals and 681 observations from 158 individual in the
university and Cnrs samples respectively. These correspond to 687 women (3,328 observations)
and 1,449 men (7,055 observations) in the university sample and 54 women (223 observations)
and 104 men (458 observations) in the Cnrs sample.
dates. We have 10,383 observations, including a total of 2,136 academics. The
panel is unbalanced as individuals enter the pool of potential candidates (usu-
ally when they get their PhD) and exit it either because they are promoted or
because they leave academia or the country over our sample period, with the av-
erage number of observations per individual being 4.9 years. The probability of
being a candidate to the aggregation is 6% for women and 8% for men, while for
researchers these figures are 10% and 19%, implying a much larger gap. The (un-
conditional) probabilities of being promoted on a given year are small, 3% to 4%
for men, and 2% for women. The table indicates that some of these differences
are likely to be explained by differences in observable characteristics. Women are
on average 3 years younger than men in the aggregation sample (though not in
the Cnrs). The main difference lies in publication records. In our larger sample,
the probability of publishing in EconLit journals is 57% and 55% for men and
women, respectively. This figure is not large, but it is important to bear in mind
that our publication criteria is stringent, especially given the strong tradition
in France to publish books and the large number of national journals, some of
which are not in EconLit. The quality of publications is somewhat higher for
men (0.46 compared to 0.42), while the quantity of publications is 30% higher
for men. For the sample of researchers, we find a higher probability of being a
publisher but a greater gender gap (91% for men but only 83% for women), and
15
a particularly large difference in the quality of publications.13
The definition and construction of our two categories of departments is de-
tailed in Appendix A and Table 10 gives the list of ‘international departments’.
The last lines in the two panels of Table 2 indicate that the one aspect in which
women seem to fare better than men is affiliation: in the larger sample 32% of
women are in international departments, while only 28% of men are. When we
focus only on researchers we find no difference in affiliation across the genders.
4 Results
4.1 The promotion of academic economists
We start by examining the determinants of being rank A for the entire popu-
lation, which are reported in Table 3. In order to run regressions equivalent to
those found in the literature on promotions in academia, where only outcomes
are observed, we construct a sample that includes all rank A and rank B aca-
demics for each of the years that we will be using latter on to estimate the
probability of being a candidate and of being promoted conditional of being a
candidate. This gives us a sample of 16,077 observations. We can thus estimate
the probability of holding a rank A position. All specifications include year fixed
effects. In column (1), only time fixed effects and gender are included in the
logit model, with the gender dummy being equal to 1 for women. The marginal
effect on gender is significant at the 1% level and large, implying an odds ratio of
0.31.14 Including age reduces the effect on gender from -0.233 to -0.165, indicat-
ing that a large fraction of the difference in promotion is indeed due to the fact
that the sample of women is younger than that of men. Column (3) includes our
three measures of research output: whether or not the individual publishes, the
quantity of publications and their quality. All three are highly significant and
increase the probability of promotion.
Once we control for research output, the effect of gender falls to -0.053, about
a quarter of the initial one, indicating that the lower promotion rate for women
is to a large extent due to them having published less. The effect is nevertheless
still strong: being a woman reduces the probability of promotion almost as
much as having one rather than two single-authored publications. The effects
we obtain are comparable to those found for the US. Ginther and Kahn (2004)
find a raw gender gap of -0.213, which falls to -0.130 once age and publication
13Obviously some of the differences in research output are due to the age structure of the two
populations, but Bosquet and Combes (2013b) show that even when controlling for age women
have worse publication records. Women are sometimes also found to be cited less than men.
This is the case in political sciences, as shown by Maliniak, Powers and Walter (2013), while
for publications in biomedical and exact sciences, Kelchtermans and Veugelers (2013) find that
women have a lower probability of reaching top citations but once they do they are as likely
as men to stay there. In contrast, the data we use exhibits no gender gap in citations once
research output is controlled for; see Bosquet and Combes (2013a).
14This values is obtained from exp(−1.182), −1.182 being the coefficient associated to the
−0.233 marginal effect.
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Table 3: Likelihood to hold a rank A position: panel 1992-2008, marginal effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
logit logit logit logit probit OLS
Women -0.233a -0.165a -0.053a -0.049a -0.048a -0.044a
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Age 0.015a 0.010a 0.010a 0.010a 0.007a
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age2 -0.000 0.000a 0.000a 0.000a 0.000a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Publisher (Pub) 0.325a 0.331a 0.329a 0.341a
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010)
Pub*Quantity 0.148a 0.151a 0.152a 0.178a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Pub*Quality 0.040a 0.041a 0.041a 0.038a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Cnrs -0.089a -0.081a -0.093a
(0.014) (0.014) (0.017)
Women*Cnrs -0.042c -0.039 -0.038
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo-R2 0.040 0.114 0.367 0.369 0.368
Observations 16077 16077 16077 16077 16077 16077
log-likelihood -9963 -9195 -6573 -6548 -6559 -6833
Standard error between brackets. a, b, c Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
records are included, indicating that differences in publications across genders
explain a greater fraction of the gap in France than in the US.
Column (4) includes a dummy for being a researcher and its interaction with
Women, and indicates that the negative effect of being a woman on seniority is
stronger for the Cnrs, although this term is significant only at the 10% level.
Columns (5) and (6) report the estimations of a probit and an OLS model, re-
spectively, and indicate that the result that women are less likely to be promoted
are robust to the use of those specifications. There is however no robust evidence
of a difference between the two tracks, with the coefficient on Women*Cnrs being
insignificant.
The result that women have lower promotion rates than men contrasts with
evidence on affiliation. Table 11 in Appendix B examines the likelihood for an
individual to be in an international department, using the same explanatory
variables as above. Women are more likely to be in a prestigious department
than men, and the effect of being a woman on the probability of being in an
international department is large.15 These results are surprising. As argued
by Lazear and Rosen (1990), it is hard to understand why women would be
15The positive effect of being female on the likelihood of being in an international department
may have three causes. The first is positive discrimination when departments consciously try
to increase their female faculty. A second is unobservable abilities, such as organisational skills
or teaching ability, which could be, on average, higher amongst female than male academics,
specially since fewer women than men that enter academia (see Petrongolo and Olivetti (2008)
on selection and gender). Lastly, a strong female presence could be the result of joint offers
made to couples by top departments.
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discriminated against in promotions but not in other labour market experiences.
In fact, in many instances the evidence tends to indicate that women have a
lower probability of both being promoted and being hired, as for example in the
case of top US orchestras; see Goldin and Rouse (2000). This does not seem to
be the case for academic economists, and raises the question of whether the low
promotion rate of female academics has a cause other than discrimination.
4.2 Decomposing outcomes
4.2.1 Gender differences in success in the concours
The limitation of our analysis so far is that it uses only outcomes and hence we
do not know whether lower observed promotions are the result of a lower likeli-
hood to apply for promotion or lower success in obtaining the promotions. We
hence examine the two separate steps. We start by considering what determines
success in the contest, conditional on being a candidate, and then move to the
determinants of the decision to enter the contest.
The determinants of success in the promotion contests are assumed to be gen-
der and the three variables measuring publications. We also include a dummy
that captures whether the individual was, at the time of application, in an in-
ternational department. This variable could measure unobserved ability –e.g.
being a good teacher– or the positive effects that being in a more stimulating
academic environment could have on the preparation of the concours. There are
as well externalities due to having colleagues who are also preparing the agre-
gation since candidates often work together and share the burden of preparing
lectures on the various topics. Lastly, in the regression for the agregation we
include a dummy for whether the candidate holds a position other than rank B
university professor in economics (i.e. the candidate is in the Cnrs, in another
field such as mathematics, comes from abroad, etc.).
The results, reported in the first four columns of Table 4, indicate that re-
search output is the key determinant of the probability of success both in the
agregation and the Cnrs concours. In the former all three measures of research
output have a significant coefficient, while for the Cnrs promotion only quality
matters. This is consistent with the fact that there is a stronger selection for
those joining the Cnrs than for those following the standard university track,
implying that the former are more homogeneous in terms of research output.
Being in an international department has a positive impact on the probability of
passing the agregation, in line with our arguments before, while it has no impact
on the probability of being promoted in the Cnrs contest.
Turning to our coefficient of interest, the impact of being female on the
probability of success conditional on being a candidate for promotion, we find no
significant difference across the genders. In fact, the probability of success in the
agregation is 24.8% for men and 24.1% for women, and hence not significantly
different. The coefficient is insignificant both for the raw probabilities and also
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Table 4: Likelihood to be promoted conditional on applying, marginal effects
Agreg’ Cnrs Agreg’: selected candidates
1992-2008 2003-2008 1992-2008
All candidates All candidates “Admissibles” Close to threshold
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
logit logit logit logit logit logit logit logit
Women -0.007 -0.018 -0.051 0.044 0.044 0.040 0.097 0.103
(0.032) (0.028) (0.078) (0.110) (0.056) (0.057) (0.082) (0.086)
Age -0.018 -0.071b -0.033 -0.042
(0.011) (0.031) (0.026) (0.039)
Age2 -0.000 0.002b 0.001 0.002
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Publisher (Pub) 0.155a 0.077 0.112 0.142
(0.047) (0.209) (0.086) (0.130)
Pub*Quantity 0.091a -0.009 0.032 -0.024
(0.019) (0.065) (0.039) (0.060)
Pub*Quality 0.047a 0.046b 0.031b 0.024
(0.006) (0.022) (0.014) (0.022)
Int. Dept. 0.090a 0.019 0.130a 0.117
(0.030) (0.088) (0.046) (0.080)
Other -0.030 0.008 0.008
(0.032) (0.069) (0.108)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo-R2 0.015 0.183 0.020 0.184 0.015 0.056 0.005 0.025
Observations 970 970 115 115 336 336 198 198
log-likelihood -531 -441 -52 -43 -201 -192 -137 -134
Standard error between brackets. a, b, c Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Int. Dept. = international department; see Appendix A for details. Other: non-French As-
sistant Professors positions in economics, as well as Cnrs and Inra researchers, and assistant
professors from other disciplines.
when we control for individual characteristics, for professors and researchers.
Gender simply does not matter.
To interpret this result consider first the Cnrs concours. Recall that the con-
cours consists of submitting a vitae and research proposal. The candidate does
not ‘perform’ in front of the committee taking the promotion decision, hence the
only reason why we would expect to find a negative coefficient on women would
be discrimination. We can then interpret the insignificant coefficient as a lack of
evidence of ex post discrimination against women in the contest. This does not
mean that discrimination does not matter, since expectations of discrimination
may have an ex ante effect on women’s choices and hence on observed outcomes,
as discussed above.
In the case of the agregation, interpreting the coefficient is more compli-
cated as it captures both potential biases in the committee and the actual per-
formance of the candidate during the oral exams that we cannot observe. A
negative and significant coefficient could then be due to either discrimination
or under-performance by women, as in the experiments performed by Gneezy
et al. (2003). Our results find no evidence of either discrimination against or
under-performance by women. It is also possible that discrimination is offset
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by over-performance or that, more generally, selection is an issue. Since fewer
women are candidates than men, as we will see below, it is possible that they
are drawn from the top of the distribution and hence that their unobserved abil-
ity is higher than that of men. The insignificant coefficient could then be the
result of opposing effects canceling out: higher unobserved ability of women and
discrimination against them.
To try to control for this, we perform two further tests exploiting the fact that
for the agregation contest we have information on which individuals passed each
stage of the competition, as well as the final rank. At the various stages of the
competition, a number of candidates are eliminated, and after the penultimate
stage a list of candidates that are admissibles is provided by the jury. These
candidates then undertake the final test, after which a ranking of all admissible
candidates is provided and, if p positions are available that year, the top p
candidates are promoted.
The first test focuses on admissible candidates only. Since at this stage a sub-
stantial number of candidates have been eliminated, if selection implies that the
unobserved quality of male candidates is lower than that of female candidates,
focusing on the ‘best’ should eliminate the (predominantly male) bottom tail of
the distribution. Columns (5) and (6) of Table 4 present those regressions and
indicate that there is no difference between men and women in either the raw
rate of passing the last step of the context or the one obtained after controlling
for output. Not surprisingly, only the quality of publications matters at this
stage. To make our sample even more comparable, we construct from the final
ranking of candidates a list of individuals close to the threshold. To do so we
take, for each year, the n admissible candidates that did not get promoted and
the n lowest-ranked candidates that did get promoted and rerun the same re-
gression equations. If discrimination against women were taking place, it would
be likely to appear in this reduced sample of candidates with similar observable
(and probably close unobservable) characteristics. The last two columns of Ta-
ble 4 show that, if anything, women are positively discriminated although the
coefficient is not significant. In fact, none of the variables we consider at this
stage are significant.
4.2.2 Likelihood to enter the concours
We turn now to the determinants of the likelihood to enter the concours. The
results are reported in Table 5. The unconditional probability of applying is
lower for women than for men both for university professors and researchers
(column 1), and the negative impact of being female is even larger once we
include individual characteristics, the marginal effect being 0.025 for professors
and 0.092 for researchers. As expected, research output has a strong effect on the
likelihood of being a candidate in either of the concours, with quality having a
stronger effect for researchers. Being in an international department is significant
only in the case of professors, where it tends to increase the probability of being
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a candidate. This may be due to the fact that, as we saw earlier, being in
a top department has a positive effect of the probability of success; potential
candidates may anticipate this and hence be more likely to apply if they are in
those departments. An additional effect may come from peer pressure to pass
the concours. Removing this variable from the analysis has no impact on the
other estimated coefficients.
Table 5: Likelihood to apply for a promotion: marginal effects
Agreg’, panel 1992-2008 Cnrs, panel 2003-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
logit logit probit OLS logit logit probit OLS
Women -0.021a -0.025a -0.027a -0.033a -0.085a -0.092a -0.087a -0.073a
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.028)
Age 0.001 -0.001 -0.016a 0.100a 0.097a 0.064a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.011) (0.010) (0.007)
Age2 -0.000a -0.000a 0.000a -0.002a -0.002a -0.001a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Publisher (Pub) 0.094a 0.094a 0.119a 0.033 0.029 0.075
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.054) (0.051) (0.047)
Pub*Quantity 0.043a 0.043a 0.050a 0.050b 0.042b 0.044b
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018)
Pub*Quality 0.010a 0.010a 0.016a 0.040a 0.040a 0.036a
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Int. Dept. 0.013b 0.012b 0.014b -0.011 -0.006 -0.008
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029)
Cnrs -0.087a -0.086a -0.130a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.009)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo-R2 0.011 0.262 0.258 0.030 0.277 0.274
Observations 10383 10383 10383 10383 681 681 681 681
log-likelihood -2779 -2075 -2087 -297 -289 -215 -216 -213
Standard error between brackets. a, b, c Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Int. Dept. = international department; see Appendix A for details.
The results indicate that women have a lower likelihood to enter the contest
for promotion. In terms of magnitude, being a woman is equivalent to decreas-
ing the number of single-authored publications by around 0.6 for the university
professors and 2 for the Cnrs researchers,16 or to decreasing the quality of pub-
lications by 87% and 81% of its standard deviation, for the university professors
and the Cnrs researchers, respectively.17
In order to try to understand what lies behind the gender gap in seeking
promotion, we examine whether the effect of gender differs between the two
types of positions. Since the costs of the agregation contest are substantially
larger than those of applying for promotion at the Cnrs, the coefficient on women
16The regression coefficients on gender and quantity in the regressions for the likelihood to
apply for the agregation and to apply for a Cnrs promotion are, respectively, −0.455, 0.740,
−1.007 and 0.501.
17The coefficients on gender and quality in the agregation and the Cnrs promotion regressions
are, respectively, −0.455, 0.170, −1.007 and 0.406, and 3.07 is the standard deviation of the
average quality of publications in our sample.
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should be higher for university professors than for researchers if differences across
the genders in these costs where holding back potential female candidates. The
first column of Table 6 hence runs a difference-in-differences regression where we
have pooled together the data for the two concours. We interact all variables
with a dummy taking the value 1 for the Cnrs concours to allow for different
impacts across the two tracks, our coefficient of interest being women interacted
with this dummy.18 The coefficient is negative and significant at the 10% level,
implying that the effect of gender on the likelihood to enter the promotion contest
is twice as high in the research track. This result indicates that the time-cost of
preparing the agregation and the implications in terms of mobility are not the
main reason why women are less likely than men to apply for promotion.
As we discussed earlier, if women have a stronger relative preference for de-
partment prestige, they may choose not to apply for promotion in order to stay
in an international department. Since promotion implies mobility for university
professors, if females cared more about department quality they would be less
willing to move –and hence to pass the agregation– whenever they are in an
international than in a national department. In contrast, for researchers promo-
tion does not require changing department and we expect to find no effect of
department of origin on the likelihood of seeking a promotion.
We hence run again the regressions for the likelihood to apply for promotion
and include an interaction between being a woman and being in a top depart-
ment. If the tradeoff between rank (i.e. income) and department quality differed
across the genders, this would be captured by a negative coefficient on being in
a top department for female professors but not for female researchers.
The marginal effects obtained from these regressions are reported in the sec-
ond and third columns of Table 6. Being in an international department does
not affect the likelihood of female researchers applying for promotion, while it
has a positive effect on whether females enter the agregation. For male university
professors the department of origin seems not to matter. This indicates, first,
that the effect on being in an international department we obtained earlier is
driven by the effect on women in top departments. Second, note that when we
consider together the two effects, that of women and that of women interacted
with international department they cancel out. This seems to indicate that, for
university professors, women in top departments are as likely as men to enter the
concours. In contrast, women in national departments and those with a research
position have a lower probability of being candidates for promotion.
The evidence so far indicates that there is a substantial difference in the like-
lihood that men and women academics apply for promotion. This gap appears
both for professors and researchers despite the differences in the costs and impli-
cations of promotion, indicating that neither the direct costs associated with the
concours nor differences in the way in which men and women trade-off income
and the quality of their department are the causes of the gender gap in seeking
18To save space, other interacted terms are not reported but are available upon request.
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Table 6: Differences across tracks and departments: likelihood to apply for a
promotion, marginal effects
All Agreg’, panel 1992-2008 Cnrs, panel 2003-2008
(1) (2) (3)
logit logit logit
Women -0.024a -0.035a -0.085a
(0.005) (0.005) (0.031)
Age 0.004c 0.001 0.100a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.011)
Age2 -0.000a -0.000a -0.002a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Publisher (Pub) 0.102a 0.094a 0.031
(0.012) (0.011) (0.054)
Pub*Quantity 0.046a 0.043a 0.050b
(0.004) (0.004) (0.020)
Pub*Quality 0.011a 0.010a 0.040a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.007)
Int. Dept. 0.015b 0.004 -0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.032)
DR2 Cnrs*Women -0.025c
(0.013)
Women*Int. Dept. 0.031b -0.016
(0.014) (0.055)
Cnrs -0.087a
(0.002)
Interacted terms Yes No No
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
pseudo-R2 0.260 0.263 0.277
Observations 11064 10383 681
log-likelihood -2318 -2072 -215
Standard error between brackets. a, b, c Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Int. Dept. = international department; see Appendix A for details. Interacted terms: all
variables interacted with applying to the DR2 Cnrs contest.
promotion.
In order to gauge the importance of women’s lower propensity to apply for
promotion, we perform a Oaxaca decomposition. Given the difficulty of inter-
preting decomposition stemming from logit regressions, we perform the decom-
position using the OLS regression in Table 5 column (4). The raw gender gap in
the probability of being promoted to rank A in our sample amounts to 1.2 per-
centage points. Although this magnitude seems small, the probability of being
promoted in a given year is only 3.3% for men, implying that being a woman
reduces it by one third. As we have seen, this difference is driven by the decision
to be a candidate, with an average male probability of being a candidate of 8.4%
and that for women being 2.2 percentage points lower, i.e. gender reduces the
likelihood to apply for promotion by one quarter.
Table 7 presents the Oaxaca decomposition for the probability of being a
candidate, Pr(C), based on column (4) of Table 5, where the only coefficient
that differs across the genders is the constant. The gender gap in the probability
of being a candidate is driven by the direct effect of gender, which is partly
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Table 7: Oaxaca decomposition of the likelihood to apply: Univ. only, OLS
% of ∆ Pr(C) explained by
Characteristics -86.8
Age -115.1
Total outcome 39.0
Publisher 13.1
Quantity 28.9
Quality -3.0
International Department -3.5
Cnrs -7.2
Coefficient 186.8
Total gap 100.0
offset by the fact that females have better characteristics in terms of age and
affiliation. The fact of being younger has the strongest impact, with a magnitude
slightly higher than that of the overall gap observed. Being in a international
department also favors women, though to a much smaller extent. In contrast,
their lower research output has a negative impact on their probability of being
a candidate which amounts to 39% of the overall effect.19 The effect of research
output is however dwarfed by the direct impact of being female, which is almost
five times larger. Without the advantage in characteristics, the gender gap would
be almost twice as large as the one we observe, as indicated by the fact that the
coefficient on women explains 187% of the overall gap. That is, the direct effect
of being female implies that the probability of applying for promotion for women
is about half that of men, although this effect is partly offset by women being
younger and in better departments.
4.3 Networks and the competitive environment
4.3.1 Network effects
One possible reason for differences in the likelihood of seeking a promotion is
that there is some individual variable that we have so far ignored and which
has an impact on the actual (or perceived) probability of success. A candidate
explanation are research networks or groups of coauthors. The idea that networks
are important in obtaining jobs and achieving promotions is widespread in the
literature, and the issue has been addressed for promotions in academia; see
McDowell and Smith (1992) for the US, Combes et al. (2008) for France and
Zinovyevay and Bagues (2012) for Spain. Coauthor networks have been shown
to differ across genders, with females having fewer coauthors and a lower fraction
19Interestingly, when we look at the three components of research output we see that women
are less likely to be publishers and, especially, have fewer publications, but they exhibit a higher
quality of publications than men.
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of male coauthors; see McDowell and Smith (1992) and Boschini and Sjo¨gren
(2007). If women have smaller or less efficient networks, then this may affect
the expected outcome and hence the payoff from entering the competition for
promotion. Potential reasons for this effect are that a candidate who has a
member of her/his network in a promotion committee has a higher likelihood
of success, but also that with a larger network the candidate’s work may be
better known and cited, or that this could provide extra information about how
to best prepare for a concours. As a result, the gap that we find between men
and women could be due to differences in coauthors and networks, and hence
including these variables would have an effect on the coefficient on gender.
In order to test this hypothesis, we construct for each individual two measures
of networks. Our measures are based on coauthorship, obviously an imperfect
measure of actual networks, but one that is quantifiable with the EconLit data.
Our first measure is the size of an individual’s network, defined as the total
number of different coauthors the researcher has had over his/her publishing
lifetime; the second is the fraction of network members that are men. More
than in other contexts, academic networks are highly endogenous, with research
output and affiliation being both causes and consequences of an individual’s
network size, and patterns of network formation have been shown to differ across
the genders; see Boschini and Sjo¨gren (2007). Moreover, being a candidate for
promotion can increase networks, especially in a system where individuals are
often candidates several years in a row, since other candidates that are met
during sessions aimed at the preparation of the agregation concours may become
coauthors. As a result, any resulting effect has to be interpreted with care,
indicating correlation rather than as having causal implications.
Table 8 reports the regressions for the likelihood of entering the promotion
contest for the two tracks, to which we have added network variables. Both
variables have positive coefficients although only one of them is significant, the
proportion of men in the case of university professors and the network’s size for
researchers. Despite the significance of these effects, the coefficients on gender
barely change as compared to our earlier specifications. The only exception is
the OLS regression for researchers where the coefficient increases from -0.073
(see Table 5) to -0.066. That is, gender gaps in networks do not seem to explain
the lower propensity of women to seek promotion. The reason is probably that
differences is network size across the genders are minor in France. In the larger
sample, the average network size is 0.88 for men and 0.82 for women, while
researchers have a large number of coauthors, averaging 2.9 for women and 3.2
for men. These differences across the genders are not statistically significant.
There is a greater gap in the fraction of men in the network, which are 70% for
females in the agregation sample and 80% for males, and although it is significant
the effect of this variable is moderate and hence its inclusion barely affects the
coefficient on gender.
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Table 8: Network effects: likelihood to apply for a promotion, marginal effects
Agreg’, panel 1992-2008 Cnrs, panel 2003-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
logit probit OLS logit probit OLS
Women -0.024a -0.026a -0.032a -0.091a -0.088a -0.066b
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.021) (0.022) (0.028)
Age 0.000 -0.002 -0.017a 0.097a 0.095a 0.061a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.011) (0.010) (0.007)
Age2 -0.000a -0.000a 0.000a -0.002a -0.002a -0.001a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Publisher (Pub) 0.086a 0.084a 0.104a -0.048 -0.057 0.013
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.060) (0.057) (0.052)
Pub*Quantity 0.042a 0.042a 0.051a 0.041b 0.034c 0.030
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
Pub*Quality 0.009a 0.009a 0.015a 0.032a 0.031a 0.030a
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Int. Dept. 0.012b 0.012b 0.013b -0.010 -0.007 -0.010
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.027) (0.027) (0.029)
Cnrs -0.087a -0.086a -0.131a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.009)
Pub*Network size 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.039b 0.040b 0.045b
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022)
% Men in Network 0.014b 0.015b 0.024a 0.057 0.058 0.046
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.044) (0.043) (0.041)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo-R2 0.263 0.259 0.291 0.290
Observations 10383 10383 10383 681 681 681
log-likelihood -2072 -2083 -291 -211 -211 -209
Standard error between brackets. a, b, c Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Int. Dept. = international department; see Appendix A for details.
4.3.2 The competition’s environment
Our final test consists of examining whether the environment under which the
competition takes place affects men and women differently. We consider two
variables. The first is the proportion of women amongst rank A professors in the
year of the competition, which can act as a proxy for ‘perceived discrimination’.
This variable has increased steadily over the period, going from 8.9% in 1992 to
15.2% in 2008. The other variable is the number of available positions as pro-
fessor, which is known before the decision to be a candidate is taken, and ranges
between 15 and 33, fluctuating substantially from year to year and showing no
clear trend.
Since the effects of these variables can be identified only over the time di-
mension of the data we consider only the concours d’agregation. For the Cnrs
we have a shorter time span, and hence little change in the fraction of women
DRs (which goes from 10.6 to 10.9), while there is too little variability in the
number of positions, as either 2, 3 or 4 are available every year. Because we are
exploiting the time dimension of the data we cannot include time fixed effects
as well as the variables of interest for the entire population. We hence consider
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two specifications. One includes time fixed effects and our two variables of in-
terest interacted with the female dummy, which allows us to see whether effects
differ across the genders but not to identify the impact on men. Alternatively,
we substitute the fixed effects by a time trend and estimate the impact of these
variables for both men and women.
Table 9: The competition’s environment: likelihood to apply for a promotion,
agregation, panel 1992-2008, marginal effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
logit logit logit logit
Women -0.093a -0.082a -0.090a -0.079b
(0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032)
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age2 -0.000a -0.000a -0.000a -0.000a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Publisher (Pub) 0.093a 0.093a 0.093a 0.093a
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Pub*Quantity 0.043a 0.043a 0.043a 0.043a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Pub*Quality 0.010a 0.010a 0.010a 0.010a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Int. Dept. 0.013b 0.013b 0.006 0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Cnrs -0.087a -0.087a -0.087a -0.087a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Time trend -0.012a -0.012a
(0.004) (0.004)
% Women rank A 0.016 0.016
(0.011) (0.011)
Women*% Women rank A 0.007c 0.006c 0.006c 0.006c
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Men*Avail.Pos. 0.002a 0.002a
(0.001) (0.001)
Women*Avail.Pos. -0.000 0.002c -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Women*Int.Dept*Avail.Pos. 0.001b 0.001b
(0.000) (0.000)
Time FE Yes No Yes No
pseudo-R2 0.263 0.262 0.264 0.263
Observations 10383 10383 10383 10383
log-likelihood -2072 -2075 -2070 -2073
Standard error between brackets. a, b, c Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Int. Dept. = international department; see Appendix A for details.
Table 9 presents the estimated regressions. Column (1) indicates that the
fraction of women amongst rank A professors has a greater effect on women
than on men, and our specification with a time trend implies that this variable
has no significant effect on men. This is consistent with the idea that perceived
discrimination is a potential cause for females’ lower propensity to apply for
promotion. Nevertheless, the coefficient on being a woman remains negative and
highly significant.
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The number of available positions has no differential effect across the genders,
as seen in column (1), and the coefficient on being female remains negative, large
and highly significant. In column (2) we try to identify the effect for both men
and women. For ease of interpretation, we interact this variable with a dummy
that takes the value 1 for males (Men*Avail.Pos) as well as with the female
dummy (Women*Avail.Pos), implying that the coefficient on this last variable
captures the overall impact of the number of positions on women’s decisions. We
can see that a greater number of available positions increases the likelihood of
being a candidate, as expected, capturing the idea that more positions imply a
greater probability of being promoted and hence encourages individuals to apply.
The coefficient is the same across the genders, although the standard error is
much greater for females, with the coefficient being significant only at the 10%
level. A possible interpretation is that women are, on average, influenced by the
number of positions just as much as men, but that there is greater variability in
their reactions.
To further explore this aspect we ask whether the large variability in this
effect stems from the fact that not all groups of women behave in the same
way. A possible division is between women who are in a national and those
in an international department. Women in different types of departments may
react differently towards competition because of unobserved characteristics; in
particular, some of them may be more ‘driven’ which makes them both manage
to get hired by a better department and be more responsive to the competi-
tion’s environment. Columns (3) and (4) indicate that there is indeed a differ-
ence in the coefficients on the number of available positions for the two groups.
Women in international departments respond to the number of positions avail-
able, with the coefficient being of the same magnitude as for men (since the
overall coefficient for this group is the sum of those on Women*Avail.Pos. and
Women*Int.Dept.*Avail.Pos.). In contrast, for women in national departments
the decision to apply for promotion seems to be unaffected by how competitive
the promotion contest is likely to be. A possible interpretation of this effect
is that, contrary to their international department counterparts, women in na-
tional departments find the idea of taking part in the contest so unattractive
that variations in the expected success rate do not affect their decision.
5 Conclusions
This paper has used data for promotions amongst academic economists in France
to look at the attitudes of women during and towards contests. We have infor-
mation both on who obtained and who was a candidate for promotion, which
allows us to test different hypotheses about the reasons that cause women’s lower
promotion rates.
On the one hand, women may be less likely to be promoted conditional
on having applied, and this could be due either to discrimination or under-
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performance during the promotion contest. On the other, female academics may
have a lower propensity to apply for promotion than males. This could in turn
be due to the requirements of the contest being more costly for women, to their
facing a different tradeoff between salaries and department prestige, or to an
unwillingness to enter the contest. The features of the French academic system,
such as a national salary scale, the need to go through a national contest in
order to be promoted, and the existence of several categories of academics with
different requirements during the contest and upon promotion, allow us to test
for these hypotheses.
We find that there is no difference between men and women in their probabil-
ity of success, but that the later are less likely than the former to enter contests.
Moreover, our results indicate that neither the differential cost of promotion nor
the tradeoff between income and department quality are behind these differences.
There are two possible explanations for our findings. One is that although
women are not discriminated against during the contest they believe they will
be, and hence decide not to enter the competition for promotion. The data
points at this as a partial explanation of gender differences, with women being
more likely to apply the more females there are amongst top-rank academics.
The alternative explanation is that women are less willing than men to enter
contests, in line with the experimental evidence provided by see Gneezy et al.
(2003), amongst others. When we try to assess the impact of the competition’s
environment, we find that, unlike for men and women in top departments, for
women in other departments the likelihood to apply for promotion is unaffected
by the number of available positions in a particular year.
Our results have two main implications. On the one hand, they provide a
link between laboratory evidence and behaviour observed in actual markets, and
indicate how patterns of behaviour, namely women’s lower propensity to take
part in contests, can be observed in both contexts and what their consequences
are for observed labour market outcomes. On the other, they raise the question
of what type of policy intervention can help increase female promotion rates. The
evidence in Gneezy et al. (2003) indicates that differences in contest participation
seem to be partly driven by differences across genders in preferences for taking
part in competitions, which can be the result of women being less confident
than men. Building confidence is a process that is difficult and probably starts
in early childhood, but changes in the way in which deciding whether to enter
a competition occurs could facilitate women’s probabilities of climbing up the
rank ladder. For example, a system of mentoring whereby junior faculty are
assigned a mentor that ‘proposes’ them as candidates for promotion may incite
more women to apply. Alternatively, creating a system in which the default is
that an individual will be considered for promotion after x years and s/he has to
opt out instead of opting in, could also be a way of overcoming the differences
in confidence across the genders.
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Appendix
A Definition of international departments
Academia in France is organised around ‘research centers’, with a university po-
tentially having several research centers in economics. We have defined ‘depart-
ments’ either by an economics department when it is the single affiliation where
economists are found in a given university (which corresponds to the majority of
cases), or by the aggregation of all research centres where there are economists
in the university. We performed robustness checks by looking at research cen-
tres rather than departments, and obtained consistent results (available upon
request). However, our notion of slightly aggregated economics departments
better matches the reality of French academic research and hence have preferred
to focus our discussion of the results on this concept.
We define ‘international departments’ as departments with the highest re-
search output, measured by both the total stock and average stock of publica-
tions per member of the department in EconLit journals. Also, we wish to take
into account both “normal” quality and top quality research, two measures that
we denote CLm and CLh, respectively, following Bosquet and Combes (2013b).
In order to do so, we apply the following procedure at each point in time. We
first calculate the total research output of a department (in terms of the CLm
and CLh measures) as the sum of research outputs of its members. We also
calculate the two scores per member of the department. Hence, we obtain 4
scores per department: CLm total, CLh total, average CLm and average CLh.
Departments are then ranked with respect to these 4 scores and their final score
is the average of these rankings.
The cutoff point for top departments is arbitrary. We choose our cutoff at
each point in time so as to have 35% of the total population in the top department
category. Since departments may change their status over time, we considered as
international departments for the entire sample period those departments which
are more often than not in the top department category.
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Table 10: List of international departments
Cepremap 1991 2004
Crest 1993 2008
Ecole Polytechnique 1991 2008
Ehess-Ens (Delta) 1991 2004
Enpc (Ceras, Latts) 1991 2004
Hec 1995 2008
University Aix Marseille 2-3 1991 2008
University Cergy 2005 2008
University Cergy-Paris 10 1991 2004
University Clermont 1 1991 2008
University Nancy 2-Strasbourg 2006 2008
University Paris 1 1991 2004
Paris School of Economics 2005 2008
University Paris 10 2005 2008
University Paris 9 1991 2008
Toulouse School of Economics 1991 2008
The last two columns give the first and last data at which the
departments are observed in the sample, respectively. Note
that some departments have been merged, as for instance
the Cepremap, the Ehess-Ens and the University Paris 1 to
form the Paris School of Economics from 2005.
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B Likelihood to be in an international department
and to hold a rank A position by category
Table 11: Likelihood to be in an international department and to hold a rank A
position by category, 1992-2008, marginal effects
International department Rank A
All All All Univ. Cnrs Univ. Cnrs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
logit logit logit logit logit logit logit
Women 0.020b 0.022b 0.068a 0.071a 0.079b -0.064a -0.120a
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.034) (0.007) (0.023)
Age -0.010a -0.009a -0.008a -0.026a 0.011a 0.059a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.007)
Age2 0.000a 0.000a 0.000a 0.001a 0.000c -0.001a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Publisher (Pub) 0.192a 0.196a 0.041 0.324a 0.036
(0.012) (0.013) (0.054) (0.013) (0.039)
Pub*Quantity 0.051a 0.049a 0.083a 0.147a 0.145a
(0.005) (0.005) (0.017) (0.004) (0.012)
Pub*Quality 0.048a 0.047a 0.058a 0.041a 0.047a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.005)
Cnrs 0.185a
(0.024)
Women*Cnrs 0.018
(0.031)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo-R2 0.012 0.014 0.082 0.056 0.118 0.347 0.487
Observations 16077 16077 16077 14848 1229 14848 1229
log-likelihood -10022 -9999 -9315 -8578 -721 -6212 -432
Standard error between brackets. a, b, c Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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